This post helped shed some light on what's going on in Iraq:
From Rudy Carrasco at Urban Onramps
WAHHABISTS & SHIITES:
Jonah at NRO writes:
"The Washington Post has a very interesting front page story on the suicide bomber factory (I'd link but I'm having laptop problems too dull to explain). NPR had a similar report. The most interesting part isn't that these guys are foreign fighters, it's that they seem to be as or more interested in fighting Shiites than fighting Americans. We know that the Wahhabists consider Shiites to be almost subhuman heretics, but one would have thought the foreign fighters pouring in would make attacking America job #1. It appears the fear of democracy in Iraq -- and the Shiite empowerment that would bring -- is still a big part of the story."
This is interesting to me because I, like many of you, am trying to figure out the opposition playback in Iraq. Let's see. The Sunnis were in line with Saddam. The Shiites, the majority in Iraq, were poorly treated by Saddam. The Shiites are prevalent in Iran, which is providing major support (to the tune of tens of millions) to renegade Shiite cleric al-Sadr. Somehow if Sistani gets significant leverage or power in post-election Iraq, that's good for who and bad for who? Good for the Shiites, good for Iran? Bad for the Sunnis, bad for the Wahhabists (i.e. Saudi Arabia) and bad for Al Qaeda?
From Rudy Carrasco at Urban Onramps
WAHHABISTS & SHIITES:
Jonah at NRO writes:
"The Washington Post has a very interesting front page story on the suicide bomber factory (I'd link but I'm having laptop problems too dull to explain). NPR had a similar report. The most interesting part isn't that these guys are foreign fighters, it's that they seem to be as or more interested in fighting Shiites than fighting Americans. We know that the Wahhabists consider Shiites to be almost subhuman heretics, but one would have thought the foreign fighters pouring in would make attacking America job #1. It appears the fear of democracy in Iraq -- and the Shiite empowerment that would bring -- is still a big part of the story."
This is interesting to me because I, like many of you, am trying to figure out the opposition playback in Iraq. Let's see. The Sunnis were in line with Saddam. The Shiites, the majority in Iraq, were poorly treated by Saddam. The Shiites are prevalent in Iran, which is providing major support (to the tune of tens of millions) to renegade Shiite cleric al-Sadr. Somehow if Sistani gets significant leverage or power in post-election Iraq, that's good for who and bad for who? Good for the Shiites, good for Iran? Bad for the Sunnis, bad for the Wahhabists (i.e. Saudi Arabia) and bad for Al Qaeda?
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